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REMOVAL OF DIRECTORS IN CLOSELY HELD
CORPORATIONS
The problem of maintaining corporate control in closely held
corporations is a continuing one for those individuals who want the
advantages of corporate existence but who wish to avoid many of the
formal requirements inherent in the corporate form. Both the ownership and the management of a close corporation are generally vested
in the stockholders, and a constant war of attrition is waged by the
stockholders against corporate handicaps that threaten effective control. Many ingenious devices, including high voting requirements for
the election of directors, shareholders' pooling agreements and voting
trusts, restrictions on the transfer of shares, and holding companies,
have been developed to avoid some of these formal requirements.1 In
order to assure effective corporate control it is essential that the
stockholders be able to remove directors who become un-co-operative
or hostile. This note concerns a device that will solve this problem
and help effectuate close control.
The Florida Business Corporation Act requires that a corporation
have at least three directors. 2 A sole proprietor who wants to incorporate his business must therefore take the risk of sharing control
with individuals who may have little or no pecuniary interest in it.
In order to maintain control over his investment he must have the
power to oust directors who, prior to the normal expiration of their
terms, turn against his policies and threaten his control.
Directors are usually elected annually at the stockholders' meeting
3
and serve a term of one year; however, most states, including Florida,
permit longer terms if provision is made in the certificate of incorporation. Although there are statutory provisions regarding the
election and length of term of directors, most states, including Florida, have no statutory provision setting forth procedure for the removal of directors. A director generally serves for the duration of his
term, and expiration of this period and failure to be re-elected constitute the normal means whereby a director is relieved of his office.
In effect, directors are insulated against removal by the stockholders
between annual elections. The recent Florida case of Frank v. An'See generally Powers, Cross Fire on the Close Corporation, 11 U.

FLA.

L.

REv.

433 (1958).
2FLA. STAT.

3FLA.

STAT.

§608.03 (1957).
§608.08 (1) (1957).
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thony4 is illustrative. This case involved a corporation with three directors, one of whom was the president and who, as original incorporator, had appointed the other two directors. Shortly after incorporation the board met and dismissed the president from that office by a
two-to-one vote. The removed president, as sole stockholder, called a
stockholders' meeting. At this meeting he dismissed the other two
directors, appointed a new board of directors, and adopted a bylaw
providing for the dismissal of a director upon majority vote of the
stock at any stockholders' meeting.
The original board refused to recognize this action and attempted
to carry on the business. The depository of the corporation's funds
refused to honor checks issued by either board until the controversy
was judicially settled. The "president" brought suit for a declaratory
judgment as to his right to the presidency and to enjoin the ousted
directors from acting in that capacity. The chancellor refused to set
aside the president's removal and upheld the right of the original
directors to continue in office. The Second District Court of Appeal
affirmed this ruling, holding that officers other than directors hold
office at the pleasure of the body appointing them, but that directors
can be removed during their terms only for cause, unless the certificate of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise. The court
noted that the latter is true even if directors attain their offices by
appointment to fill vacancies. The court also denied the plaintiff's
contention that his peremptory dismissal as president was good cause
for the removal of the directors.
It should be noted that although the decision reached in this
case is supported in every instance by the cyclopedias, 5 treatises,6 and
hornbooks,7 certain factors extant in the case made the court's task
much easier. The two ousted directors, though not technically stockholders at the time, had a substantial pecuniary interest in the corporation and were to be issued a majority of the stock. The plaintiffpresident was the sole stockholder by a mere fortuity; in fact, he owned
only an insignificant amount of stock.
It is true that within the broad principles of corporate law stock4107 So.2d 136 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
5See, e.g., 13 Am. JUR., Corporations §880 (Supp. 1958); 19 C.J.S., Corporations
§738 (1940).
6
See, e.g., 2 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS §352 (perm. rev. ed. 1954); 1 O'NAL,
CLOSE CORPORATIONS §3.59 (1958).
7See, e.g., BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS §185 (1946); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS §163
(2d ed. 1949).
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holders have an inherent right to remove directors, 8 but this right
can be exercised only "for cause." This method of removal requires
that the accused director be given proper notice and an opportunity
to be heard, 9 and it is subject to close judicial scrutiny. Nevertheless,
the power to remove for cause is no small power, and it behooves
stockholders to investigate what action or lack of action on the part
of a director might be sufficient cause for his removal. "There are
few decisions on what is sufficient cause for removal,"10 but as a general proposition there must be some malfeasance or nonfeasance in
office." A director cannot be removed at the whim of the stockholders
or because of a mere mistake or misunderstanding." The harassing of
fellow officers and employees in transacting company business has been
held sufficient cause.' 3 Cause will also lie if a director sells all of his
stock in the corporation,' 4 or allows payment of rebates contrary to
the board's direction,5 or deliberately violates a corporate bylaw.' 6
A desire to change corporate policy or a mere difference of opinion
is not sufficient cause.
Because of the narrow confines of removal for cause, the best
procedure for stockholders who wish to insure maintenance of this
aspect of corporate control is to include in the articles of incorporation
a provision whereby a majority of the stock may, at a duly called
special meeting, dismiss a director.' 7 The Frank case factually points
up one danger in making such a provision in the original organic
corporate law - the majority investors may lose control when there is
an interim period between the making of their investment and their
acquisition of the stock.
Another method for effectuating this result is through legislation.
sSee, e.g., Doolittle v. Morley, 77 Idaho 366, 292 P.2d 476 (1956); Auer v.
Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954); Tremsky v. Green, 106 N.Y.S.2d 572
(Sup. Ct. 1951); 2 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS §351 (perm. rev. ed. 1954).
9Frank v. Anthony, 107 So.2d 136 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958); Auer v. Dressel, supra
note 8. See also Abberger v. Kulp, 156 Misc. 210, 281 N.Y. Supp. 373 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
10BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS

§ 185,

at 435 & n.36 (1946).

lSee 2 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS §356 (perm. rev. ed. 1954).
12Fox v. Cody, 141 Misc. 552, 252 N.Y. Supp. 395 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
13Markovitz v. Markovitz, 336 Pa. 145, 8 A.2d 46 (1939).
14Selley v. American Lubricator Co., 119 Iowa 591, 93 N.V. 590 (1903).
l5Koppitz-Melchers, Inc. v. Koppitz, 315 Mich. 582, 24 N.W.2d 220 (1946).
loTempleman v. Grant, 75 Colo. 519, 227 Pac. 551 (1924).
liSee, e.g., Templeman v. Grant, supra note 16; Petition of Singer, 189 Misc.
150, 70 N.Y.S.2d 550, afJ'd, 75 N.Y.S.2d 514 (App. Div. 1947); 19 C.J.S., Corporations

§738, at 72 (1940).
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Twenty-nine states,' 8 including Florida, make no express statutory
provision for the removal of directors; this silence has been interpreted
as prohibiting removal except for cause before expiration of a director's term. Eighteen states19 have statutes authorizing the stockholders
to remove directors at their pleasure by a specified majority vote of
the stock. There can be little doubt that the widespread practice of
including a provision in the certificate or bylaws for removal of
directors by a majority vote of the stock at a special meeting has
prompted such legislation.
Florida should consider amending its present corporation act to
allow stockholders to remove a director at any time. Until this is
done, however, incorporators of a closely held corporation should
expressly provide in the certificate or bylaws for removal of directors
in order to assure themselves of continued corporate control.
DONALD

M.

BOLLING

1SAla., Ariz., Ark., Colo., Conn., Del., Fla., Ga., Ill., Ind., Kan., Ky., Me., Mass.,
Miss., Mo., Neb., N.H., NJ., N.M., N.Y., Ore., R.I., S.C., Tenn., Tex., Vt., W.

Va., Wyo.
l9See BALLENTINE, CORPORATNS §185, at 435 & n.37 (1946).
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